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For several years, the health care industry has been struggling
to minimize the highly publicized rise in health care costs. Early
in this struggle, it was determined that hospitals could reduce
their costs of operation by forming cooperative organizations to
perform various supportive services, such as laundry, purchasing,
and data processing. Such organizations typically perform only
one or a few specialized services for their member hospitals who,
in return, share the costs of the organization. Although much of
the savings generated by such hospital service organizations come
as a result of economies of scale, preserving these savings is often
dependent upon the organization's ability to secure tax-exempt
status.
Despite this need for tax-exempt status, and despite the in-
creasing number of hospital service organizations which are being
established in an effort to contain costs, the tax status of such
organizations remains an area of controversy and confusion. The
source of the problem is the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) which
continually resists the granting of tax-exempt status to many hos-
pital service organizations.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Until recently, the controversy involving hospital service
organizations had been confined to federal district courts and the
Court of Claims.' However, the Tax Court and the Third and Ninth
* Associated with the law firm of Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda in
Omaha, Nebraska. B.G.S. 1976, University of Nebraska at Omaha; J.D. 1978,
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; LL.M. in Taxation 1979, Washington Univer-
sity.
t The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the help of his friend and
colleague, Patricia A. Zieg, in reviewing the drafts of this article.
1. See Northern Cal. Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. CL 1979);
Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1979); Community Hosp.
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Circuit Courts of Appeals have now entered the controversy in As-
sociated Hospital Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 HCSC-Laundry
v. United States,3 and Hospital Central Services Association v.
United States,4 respectively. The facts of these recent cases are
neither unique nor complex when compared with the other cases
concerning hospital service organizations.
In Associated Hospital, a nonprofit corporation provided a "bac-
teria-free" laundry service to its member hospitals, all of which
were tax-exempt and were unable to get the services through the
commercial laundries in their vicinity. The nonprofit corporation
was controlled by its member hospitals and was operated in such a
way that little or no net income was realized.
HCSC-Laundry involved a nonprofit corporation whose sole ac-
tivity was providing laundry and linen services to member non-
profit hospitals and nonprofit volunteer ambulance services. All of
the members had tax-exempt status. The nonprofit corporation re-
alized no net income from its operations.
Similarly, Hospital Central Services involved a nonprofit corpo-
ration which was formed by tax-exempt hospitals to perform the
sole function of providing highly-sanitized laundry services to the
members of the corporation. The nonprofit corporation only
charged its member hospitals an amount which was sufficient to
meet its annual operating expenses.
Im. THE ISSUES
The hospital service organization controversy has primarily in-
volved two arguments. In Associated Hospital, HCSC-Laundry,
and Hospital Central Services, the IRS asserted the same two ar-
guments to the Courts of Appeal and the Tax Court as it had as-
serted to the federal district courts and the Court of Claims in
earlier cases.5 The IRS first argued that hospital service organiza-
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-934 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ap-
peal docketed, No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); HCSC-Laundry v. United
States, 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980); Met-
ropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857
(E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No.
78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); Hospital Cent. Serv. Assoc. v. United States, 40
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash. 1977), rev'd, 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980);
United Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974);
Hospital Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp.
560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
2. [19801 TAx CT. REP. DEc. (P-H) $ 74.17.
3. 624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'g., 473 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
4. 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'g., 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash.
1977).
5. See note 1 supra.
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tions were not entitled to tax-exempt status because they did not
fall within the safe-harbor of section 501(e) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code,6 a specific provision dealing with the tax exemption of
hospital service organizations ("the section 501(c) (3) argument").
The hospital service organizations' response, typical of the
counter-argument made in the previous cases, was that they are
entitled to tax-exempt status under section 501(c) (3),7 the general
exemption provision for charitable organizations, and that they did
not need to rely on section 501(e). It is the position of the IRS that
section 501(e) is the only provision of the Code which grants ex-
empt status to hospital service organizations and that section
501(c) (3) is not applicable.
The second argument made by the IRS was that the hospital
6. Section 501(e) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(e) Cooperative hospital service organizations.-For purposes of this title,
an organization shall be treated as an organization organized and op-
erated exclusively for charitable purposes, if-
(1) such organization is organized and operated solely-
(A) to perform, on a centralized basis, one or more of the follow-
ing services which, if performed on its own behalf by a hospital
which is an organization described in subsection (c) (3) and ex-
empt from taxation under subsection (a), would constitute activi-
ties in exercising or performing the purpose or function
constituting the basis for its exemption: data processing, purchas-
ing, warehousing, billing and collection, food, clinical, industrial en-
gineering, laboratory, printing, communications, record center, and
personnel (including selection, testing, training, and education of
personnel) services.
I.R.C. § 501(e).
7. Section 501(c) (3) provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 501. Exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc.
(a) Exemption from taxation.-An organization described in sub-
section (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation
under this subtitle unless such exemption is denied under Section
502 or 503.
(c) List of exempt organizations-The following organizations are
referred to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only
if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of
which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influ-
ence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)),
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the pub-
lishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on be-
half of any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
service organizations were also not entitled to tax-exempt status
because they were "feeder" organizations within the meaning of
section 502(a), 8 the provision of the Code that denies tax-exempt
status to organizations which are run "for profit" and which con-
tribute their profits to tax-exempt organizations ("the section 502
argument"). The typical response of the hospital service organiza-
tions to the section 502 argument was that section 502 was not ap-
plicable since (1) they were not run "for profit", and (2) they were
each an integral part of the exempt activities of their member hos-
pitals.
Previously, the federal district courts and the Court of Claims
had rejected both the section 501(c) (3) argument and the section
502 argument made by the IRS, and had granted tax-exempt status
to hospital service organizations. But recently, the Tax Court, in
Associated Hospital, accepted the IRS's section 502 argument.9
Additionally, the Third and Ninth Circuits, in HCSC-Laundry'O
and Hospital Central Services," respectively, accepted the IRS's
section 501(c) (3) argument.
In Associated Hospital, the Tax Court, in accepting the section
502 argument, held that the hospital service organization was a
feeder organization which was ineligible for tax-exempt status;
however, the Tax Court did not address the section 501(c) (3) argu-
ment. Unlike the Tax Court, the Third and Ninth Circuits took a
position on the section 501(c) (3) argument and held that section
501(e) pre-empted the applicability of section 501(c) (3) to hospital
service organizations. However, the Third and Ninth Circuits did
not take a position on the section 502 argument. Thus, the Tax
Court and the Courts of Appeal addressed different issues in the
hospital service organization controversy, but none of the courts
addressed both issues.
Inasmuch as the Tax Court, the Third Circuit and the Ninth Cir-
cuit have taken positions adverse to that taken in six other juris-
dictions, the recent decisions in Associated Hospital, HCSC-
Laundry, and Hospital Central Services warrant close review.
This is particularly true since they may have an impact on those
appeals currently pending in the Sixth Circuit.1 2 Indeed, the Ninth
8. Section 502(a) provides: "(a) General Rule.-An organization operated for the
primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall not be ex-
empt from taxation under section 501 on the ground that all of its profits are
payable to one or more organizations exempt from taxation under section
501." I.R.C. § 502(a).
9. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17.
10. 624 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980).
11. 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980).
12. See Community Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-934
(E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); Metro-
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Circuit based its decision in Hospital Central Services entirely
upon the precedent set by the Third Circuit's HCSC-Laundry deci-
sion.13
A. The Section 502 Argument and Associated Hospital
1. The Validity of the Section 502 Regulations
a. The Background of the Section 502 Regulations
As noted by the Tax Court at the outset of its Associated Hospi-
tal decision, "[t]he tax history of hospital service organizations,
and laundry service organizations in particular, is a long and
stormy one."' 4 Accordingly, before analyzing the Tax Court's ap-
plication of section 502 in Associated Hospital, a brief review of
section 502 would be in order.
Prior to the enactment of section 502's predecessors, a number
of commercial organizations were held to be tax-exempt organiza-
tions merely because they paid all their profits over to an exempt
organization.15 This raised a feeling that a tax exemption gave to
tax-exempt organizations an unfair economic advantage in com-
peting with taxable businesses. 16 The Revenue Act of 1950 sought
to eliminate this unfair advantage by removing the tax exemption
available to businesses whose activities were unrelated to charity,
but whose profits were turned over to charities. Such businesses
became known as "feeder" organizations. Perhaps the most strik-
ing example of a feeder organization involved New York University
School of Law's ownership of the nation's then largest noodle man-
ufacturer.' 7 In what is now section 502, a feeder organization,
which is denied tax-exempt status, is defined as an "organization
operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or busi-
ness for profit" which pays all of its profits to an exempt organiza-
tion.' 8
After the enactment of section 502's predecessor, section 39.101-
2(b) of Regulation 117 was adopted by the Treasury Department.
Section 39.101-2(b) was carried over after the enactment of the 1954
Code to become Treasury Regulation section 1.502-1(b). This regu-
politan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich.
1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No. 78-1218 (6th
Cir. June 7, 1978).
13. 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980), revg., 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash.
1977).
14. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) % 74.17 at 118.
15. See, e.g., C.F. -Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951);
Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
16. 96 CONG. REC. 13273 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1951).
17. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
18. I.R.C. § 502(a).
1981]
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lation attempts to clarify, by example, when an organization re-
lated to a tax-exempt organization can itself qualify for tax-exempt
status. This regulation reads as follows:
[Example 1] If a subsidiary organization of a tax-exempt organization
would itself be exempt on the ground that its activities are an integral part
of the exempt activities of the parent organization, its exemption would
not be loss because, as a matter of accounting between the two organiza-
tions, the subsidiary derives a profit from its dealings with its parent or-
ganization, for example, a subsidiary organization which is operated for
the sole purpose of furnishing electric power used by its parent organiza-
tion, a tax-exempt educational organization, in carrying on its educational
activities. [Example 21 However, the subsidiary organization is not ex-
empt from tax if it is operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a
trade or business which would be an unrelated trade or business (that is,
unrelated to exempt activities) if regularly carried on by the parent organ-
ization. For example, if a subsidiary organization is operated primarily for
the purpose of furnishing electric power to consumers other than its par-
ent organization (and the parent's tax-exempt subsidiary organizations),
it is not exempt since such business would be an unrelated trade or busi-
ness if regularly carried on by the parent organization. [Example 3] Simi-
larly, if the organization is oumed by several unrelated exempt
organizations, and is operated for the purpose of furnishing electric power
to each of them, it is not exempt since such business would be an unrelated
trade or business if regularly carried on by any one of the tax-exempt or-
ganizations.
1 9
It is the third example of the above-quoted regulation which is
the basis of the IRS's section 502 argument. The IRS contends that
hospital service organizations organized in a manner similar to
that involved in Associated Hospital fall within the meaning of this
third example.
b. The Hospital Bureau Case
Prior to Associated Hospital, a hospital service organization
had successfully challenged an IRS application of the third exam-
ple, and thereby precluded its being characterized as a feeder
organization.20 The taxpayer in the Hospital Bureau case was a
corporation formed to evaluate and purchase the necessary hospi-
tal supplies for its members who were tax-exempt, charitable hos-
pitals. The government took the position that the corporation was
not entitled to tax-exempt status. However, the Court of Claims
held that the cooperative purchasing corporation was itself an ex-
empt organization because it was not an "organization operated for
the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit."2 1
Instead, the corporation in question was found to have been en-
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (1980) (emphasis added).
20. See Hospital Bureau of Standards & Supplies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F.
Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
21. Id. at 563.
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gaged in a business enterprise which bore a close relationship to
the functioning of the tax-exempt hospitals and was an "integral
part of the operation of its hospital members."' 2 The Hospital Bu-
reau decision is now the leading case in the hospital service organ-
ization controversy.
c. Congressional Response to IRS Tenacity-Section 501(e)
Despite the Court of Claims' decision in Hospital Bureau, the
IRS held to its position that if two or more exempt hospitals joined
together and created an entity to perform services for the hospi-
tals, the entity is not tax-exempt.2 3
In an effort to change the position taken by the IRS, Congress,
in 1968, enacted section 501(e) of the Code.24 Section 501(e) pro-
vides that cooperative hospital service organizations will qualify
for exemption if they perform one of the following services: data
processing, purchasing, warehousing, billing and collection, food,
industrial engineering, laboratory, printing, communications, rec-
ord center and personnel.25
The enactment of section 501(e) did not stay the controversy
involving hospital service organizations. The Service's position as
to the applicability of section 502 remains the same for those hospi-
tal services organizations which provide services other than those
specified in section 501(e). Despite its persistence, the IRS's sec-
tion 502 argument, prior to Associated Hospital, had been consist-
ently rejected by courts.26 The basic rationale of the courts was
that section 502 was not applicable because hospital service organi-
zations are not profit-making ventures.
d. Associated Hospital-A Break with Precedent
Contrary to the decisions of other courts, in Associated Hospi-
22. Id. at 562.
23. See T.D. 6662, 1963-2 C.B. 214, which amended Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) to limit
the concept of related organizations to a parent-subsidiary relationship. See
also, S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1967).
24. Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 109, 82
Stat. 251 (1968) (current version at LR.C. § 501(e)).
25. I.R.C. § 501(e).
26. See Northern Cal. Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United.States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Community Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 79-934
(E.D. Mich. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); HCSC-
Laundry v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428
(3d Cir. 1980); Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States,
445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May
25, 1978) and No. 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); Hospital Cent. Serv. Assoc. v.
United States, 40 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash. 1977), rev'd, 623 F.2d




tal, the Tax Court held that hospital service organizations, which
provide services not listed in section 501(e), are subject to the pro-
hibition of section 502 by virtue of the regulations promulgated
thereunder, more specifically the third example expressed in Reg-
ulation section 1.502-1 (b), quoted above.27 The Tax Court reached
this holding despite the fact that it seriously questioned the origi-
nal validity of the regulation's third example.28 However, the Tax
Court upheld the regulation on the basis of the Reenactment Doc-
trine.
The so-called Reenactment Doctrine was first enunicated in
Helvering v. Winmill,29 as follows: "[tireasury regulations and in-
terpretations long continued without substantial change, applying
to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to
have received congressional approval and have the effect of law. '30
The Tax Court felt compelled to apply the Reenactment Doctrine
in Associated Hospital (which involved a hospital service organi-
zation which only rendered laundry services) since Congress had
on two occasions, in 1968 and 1976, clearly decided not to make
laundry services an exempt activity under section 501(e).31
The Tax Court's application of the Reenactment Doctrine is
troublesome for two reasons. First, the majority overlooks the fact
that, at the same time Congress was discussing laundry services, it
also recognized and approved of the leading case granting section
501(c) (3) exemption to hospital service organizations. 32 It is cer-
tainly arguable that Congress viewed the Hospital Bureau deci-
sion as protecting hospital service organizations from being
characterized as feeder organizations under section 502.33 This ar-
gument is further bolstered by the fact that Congress chose to en-
act a special provision (section 501(e)) to help protect hospital
service organizations.
Second, the legislative history relating to the enactment of sec-
tion 501(e), which evolved subsequent to Hospital Bureau, does
not discuss laundry services in the context of section 502, but
rather in the context of section 501; thus, it is difficult to under-
27. See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
28. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17 at 124-25.
29. 305 U.S. 79 (1938).
30. Id. at 83 (footnotes omitted).
31. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) $ 74.17 at 126. Although Congress considered
including laundry services in section 501 (e)'s list of exempted activities, Con-
gress expressly declined to do so both in 1968 with the original enactment of
the statute and later in 1976. See H.R. REP. No. 1533, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 43
(1967); 122 CONG. REC. No. 1365, S. 13568; S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 537 (1976).
32. 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
33. See [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17 at 127 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
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stand how Congress' refusal to include laundry services among the
exempt activities of section 501(e) significantly contributes to the
validity of a regulation promulgated under section 502.34 Indeed,
several courts have found that the exclusion of laundry services
from the exempt activities of section 501(e) was not a Congres-
sional statement of policy.35 Judge Tannenwald, in his dissent to
the Associated Hospital decision, was also troubled by the Tax
Court's application of the Reenactment Doctrine, and stated:
It is sufficient to note that Congress was aware, as early as 1967, of the
position of [the IRS] and of the Court of Claims decision adverse thereto
in Hospital Bureau .... The subsequent legislative history, relating to
the enactment of section 501(e), simply articulates the proposition that
that section does not exempt cooperative laundry services such as those
engaged in by [Associated Hospital Services, Inc.]. Against this back-
ground of dual awareness and narrow articulation, I am not convinced that
it can fairly be said that the reenactment doctrine should be applied to
support [the IRS's] regulation.3 6
In summary, given the Tax Court's clear reluctance to uphold
the validity of the section 502 regulation, 37 and given the aforemen-
tioned problems with the application of the Reenactment Doctrine
to support the validity of that regulation, the IRS's argument that
hospital service organizations constitute section 502 feeder organi-
zations is not particularly convincing. Although the IRS won the
battle in Associated Hospital, it may lose the war should its sec-
tion 502 regulation be held invalid in future litigation.
2. The Application of Section 502 in Associated Hospital
The foregoing discussion of the IRS's section 502 argument has
focused on the validity of the third example of the section 502 regu-
lation. The following discussion will focus upon the Tax Court's
application of Regulation section 1.502-1(b), to the hospital service
organization involved in Associated Hospital. Section 502, in perti-
nent part, provides: "[a]n organization operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall not be
exempt under section 501 on the ground that all of its profits are
payable to one or more organizations exempt under section 501
from taxation. '3 8
34. Id. at 129 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
35. See Northern Cal. Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857
(E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No.
78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); United Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 384 F.
Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
36. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17 at 127 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 124-25.
38. I.R.C. § 502(a).
1981]
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Section 502 and section 1.502-1(b) of the treasury regulations,3 9
if taken literally, appear to require that a trade or business have at
least two characteristics before it will be considered a feeder or-
ganization: (1) the organization must generate a profit; and (2) the
trade or business must be unrelated to the exempt purpose of the
organization to which the profits are paid. With regard to the first
characteristic, the Tax Court held in Associated Hospital that this
apparent requirement is, in fact, not a requirement. Thus, a trade
or business can be a feeder organization without generating a
profit. The Tax Court stated:
In this context, the words 'for profit' do not establish an independent re-
quirement; they are used in the statute merely to modify the term 'trade
or business' to make it clear that a section 502 organization must be a com-
mercial organization rather than an organization operated for an inher-
ently exempt purpose.
4 °
Judge Tannenwald clearly disagreed with this reasoning in his
dissenting opinion, and stated:
Section 502(a), dealing with the denial of exemptions to feeder organiza-
tions, specified '[a]n organization operated for the primary purpose of
carrying on a trade or business for profit.' (Emphasis added.) As the ma-
jority points out, that section was directed against the grant of exemption
to a commercial organization merely because its profit inured to the bene-
fit of an exempt organization-a situation typified by C.F. Mueller Co. v.
Commissioner .... In my opinion, consideration by the Congress of the
effect of competition took place within the 'fbr profit' context.
... Although the petitioner herein was carrying on a trade or busi-
ness, it clearly was not doing so for the primary purpose of profit there-
from. Indeed, as the majority concedes, it was a nonprofit organization
and was 'operated in such a way that it realize [d] little or no net in-
come.'
4 1
Judge Tannenwald seems to have the better view as to the in-
terpretation of "for profit" within the context of section 502. To ac-
cept the Tax Court's view that "trade or business for profit" is
merely another way of saying "an unrelated trade or business" not
only renders the phrase "for profit" meaningless, but also is con-
trary to the legislative history of section 502. When Congress en-
acted section 502, it clearly had in mind the situation where a
commercial organization gained a tax-exempt status by virtue of
paying its profit to another exempt organization.4 Thus, Congress
contemplated that "profits" meant the generating of revenue be-
yond operating expenses, with such excess revenues then being
paid to an exempt organization.
With regard to the second characteristic, the regulations under
39. See Treas. Reg. § 502(1) (b) (1980).
40. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17 at 124.
41. Id. at 127 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting),(footnotes omitted).
42. Id.; C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
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section 502 provide, in essence, that a subsidiary organization of a
tax-exempt organization is not a feeder organization if its activities
are substantially related to the exempt purpose of its parent organ-
ization.43 The majority decision in Associated Hospital failed to
address this issue; however, Judge Wilbur's dissent faced the issue
and stated that there could hardly be anything more closely re-
lated to a hospital's exempt purpose than a bacteria-free laundry.44
Also, it should be noted that the courts themselves have consist-
ently held the provision of laundry services to be substantially re-
lated to hospital activities.45 Since hospital service organizations
do not usually have either of the characteristics attributable to
feeder organizations, the Tax Court's "feeder organization" ration-
ale is deficient.
B. The Section 501(c)(3) Argument
Just as the enactment of section 501(e) did not stay the IRS's
section 502 argument, neither did it stay the section 501(c) (3) argu-
ment. With the enactment of the statute, the IRS took the position
that hospital service organizations conducting activities other than
those specified in section 501(e) were not entitled to tax-exempt
treatment under either section 501(e) or section 501(c) (3). The
IRS's rationale for its position is that, since section 501(e) specifi-
cally addresses tax exemption for hospital service organizations,
the general exemption provision of section 501(c) (3) is no longer
applicable to such organizations. In short, the IRS argued that
43. The dissent in Associated Hospital stated:
Sec. 1.502-1(b), Income Tax Regs., says as much. It notes that a sub-
sidiary organization of a tax-exempt organization can be exempt 'on
the ground that its activities are an integral part of the exempt activi-
ties of the parent.' It then states: However, the subsidiary organiza-
tion is not exempt from tax if it is operated for the primary purpose
of carrying on a trade or business which would be an unrelated trade
or business (that is, unrelated to exempt activities) if regularly car-
ried on by the parent organization. For example, if a subsidiary or-
ganization is operated primarily for the purpose of furnishing electric
power to consumers other than its parent organization (and the par-
ent's tax-exempt subsidiary organizations), it is not exempt since
such business would be an unrelated trade or business if regularly
carried on by the parent organization.
[1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 74.17 at 128 n.3 (Wilbur, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in original).
44. Id. at 128 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
45. See Northern Cal. Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624
F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1980); Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. v. United States, 445
F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25,
1978) and No. 78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); United Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974); Hospital Bureau of Standards & Sup-
plies, Inc. v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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hospital service organizations can only be exempt if they engage
exclusively in those activities listed in section 501(e). Prior to the
Third Circuit's reversal of HCSC-Laundry and the Ninth Circuit's
reversal of Hospital Central Services, this position had been uni-
formly rejected by the courts.46 The rationale of these courts was
that the Congress intended to provide a "safe harbor" tax exemp-
tion for hospital service organizations, and thus, section 501(e)
broadens the scope of section 501 rather than restricting it in any-
way. Consequently, hospital service organizations are still entitled
to a section 501(c) (3) exemption.
The Tax Court did not take a position on the section 501(c) (3)
argument in Associated Hospital. The Tax Court merely quoted
from United Hospital Services, Inc. v. United States,47 as follows:
'The clearly expressed Congressional purpose behind the enactment of
Section 501(e) was to enlarge the category of charitable organizations
under Section 501(a) (3) to include certain cooperative hospital service or-
ganizations, and not to narrow or restrict the reach of Section 501(c) (3).
The latter section was not modified by the legislation in any way, and the
legislation does not purport to take away charitable status from a corpora-
tion which had already acquired it. Insofar as this case is concerned,
therefore, Section 501(e) is irrelevant.'4 8
However, the HCSC-Laundry decision clearly addressed the issue.
In HCSC-Laundry, the Third Circuit accepted the IRS's section
501(c) (3) argument, and, in doing so, adopted a position contrary
to that taken by all other courts which had considered the issue.
49
The section 501(c) (3) argument was characterized by the Third
Circuit as one involving the statutory rule of construction known
as ejusdem generis, i.e., a specific statute controls over a general
statute. Before applying this rule of construction, the Third Circuit
noted, by means of a quote from Merten's The Law of Federal In-
come Taxation, that "this rule of ejusdem generis is not invariable
and should not defeat the legislative intent deducible from the en-
tire context."'5 0 Accordingly, the Third Circuit, after conditioning
46. See Northern Cal. Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979);
Chart, Inc. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1979); Community Hosp.
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R. 2d (.P-H) 79-934 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ap-
peal docketed, No. 79-1286 (6th Cir. May 29, 1979); HCSC-Laundry v. United
States, 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d 428 (3rd Cir. 1980);
Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857
(E.D. Mich. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1205 (6th Cir. May 25, 1978) and No.
78-1218 (6th Cir. June 7, 1978); Hospital Cent. Serv. Assoc. v. United States, 40
A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash. 1977), rev'd, 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980);
United Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1979).
47. 384 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. Ind. 1974).
48. [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEc. (P-H) $ 74-17 at 121.
49. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
50. 624 F.2d 428, 433 (3d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 60:35
TAX EXEMPT STATUS
the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine on the legislative
history of section 501(e), proceeded to review such history.
The Third Circuit's review of the legislative history of section
501(e), in large part, did not differ from that set forth above.51
However, the Third Circuit discounted the significance of the Hos-
pital Bureau decision in its analysis of section 501(e) by stating,
"[t] hat decision provides little assistance to the statutory analysis
we must now undertake when the sttute contains the subse-
quently enacted provision directly applicable to hospital service
organizations." 5 2 This dismissal of the significance of Hospital Bu-
reau in interpreting the later enacted section 501(e) is not shared
by others who have considered the issue.53 This is because it is
generally felt that Congress was aware of the decision and did not
intend to alter it. In Northern California Central Services, Inc. v.
United States, the Court of Claims reviewed the vitality of its Hos-
pital Bureau decision as follows:
In Hospital Bureau of Standards, we held that a cooperative hospital
purchasing organization serving several non-profit hospitals was exempt
from income tax under the predecessor of § 501(c) (3). The Senate Fi-
nance Committee, in 1967, mentioned that decision as the 'leading case,'
when it attempted to add a provision to the Social Security Amendments
of 1967 .... The Committee reasoned that such a provision [Section
501(e) ] was necessary because despite the decision in Hospital Bureau of
Standards, some hospitals were reluctant to form shared service organi-
zations due to the resistance of the IRS ....
When Congress passed the present § 501(e) in 1968, though, it did ex-
clude shared laundry services from its list of exempt service organiza-
tions, but made no attempt to alter Hospital Bureau of Standards'
interpretation of § 501(c) (3) or that section's applicability to shared laun-
dry services, despite the fact, above mentioned, that the Congressmen
were aware of Hospital Bureau of Standards, and its holding.5 4
Besides its dismissal of the significance of the Hospital Bureau
decision, the Third Circuit's reading of section 501(e)'s legislative
history is also questionable on the grounds that section 501(e) was
generally thought of as a relief-granting measure, and not as a
measure to close a "loop-hole.15 5 Thus, given these two considera-
tions, the doctrine of ejusdem generis should not have been ap-
plied to defeat the relief-granting intent of Congress.
Even ignoring its questionable readifig of section 501(e)'s legis-
51. See notes 14-19 & accompanying text supra.
52. 624 F.2d at 435.
53. See Northern CaL Cent. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. CL. 1979);
HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also,
Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc., v. Commissioner, [1980] TAx CT. REP. DEC.
(P-H) 74.17 at 127 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); Id. at 129 (Wilbur, J., dis-
senting).
54. 591 F.2d at 624.
55. See 591 F.2d 620 (Ct. Cl. 1979). See also note 39 & accompanying text supra.
1981]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lative history, the Third Circuit's reversal of HCSC-Laundry is
also troublesome because its holding appears to be based upon cir-
cular reasoning. The Third Circuit stated:
We believe that it [section 501(e)'s legislative history] demonstrates that
Congress recognized that hospital service organizations were not hereto-
fore encompassed within section 501(c), or that their inclusion within that
section was questionable.... If they [the hospital service organizations]
had already been within section 501(c), the enactment of section 501(e)
would have been a totally superfluous undertaking by Congress, an anom-
alous result which we cannot attribute to it.
5 6
As noted above, the Third Circuit's holding was originally pre-
mised on the statutory rule of ejusdem generis, and thus was con-
ditional upon an analysis of legislative history. Yet the Third
Circuit then attempted, as the above quote demonstrates, to justify
its reading of the legislative history by applying the statutory rule
of ejusdem generis (i.e., that the specific section 501(e) must con-
trol the general section 501(c) (3)). Therefore, the Third Circuit's
rationale can be criticized as being circular.
The Ninth Circuit also recently considered the section
501(c) (3) argument. In Hospital Central Services Association v.
United States, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court decision
and tersely adopted the view and reasoning of the Third Circuit in
HCSC-Laundry.57 The entire substance of the decision in Hospi-
tal Central Services is reflected in the fifth and final paragraph of
the opinion:
Whether the legislative decision to favor the commercial laundry industry
by removing a tax advantage from competitors was a wise or equitable
decision is obviously not a judicial question. On the only judicial ques-
tion-the meaning of the tax law-we agree with the Third Circuit for the
reasons stated it its opinion.5 8
In comparison with the decisions of the Tax Court and the
Third Circuit, it is clear that Hospital Central Services offers little
to the resolution of the hospital service organization controversy,
and, for the reasons already discussed, 59 the merit of the decision
is questionable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Associated Hospital, HCSC-Laundry and Hos-
pital Central Services, are the first taxpayer defeats in the hospital
service organization controversy. As indicated above, however,
these decisions' holdings were reached through challengable anal-
56. See 624 F.2d 428, 436 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'g 473 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
57. 623 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'g., 40 A.F.T.R. 2d (P-H) 77-5646 (W.D. Wash.
1977).
58. 623 F.2d at 612.
59. See notes 43-49 & accompanying text supra.
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ysis. Also, the holdings in all three of these cases might be limited
to their facts because these cases involved hospital service organi-
zations which only provided laundry services. Although the hold-
ings of the Tax Court and the Courts of Appeal were different, the
critical factor to each of the courts was the fact that Congress had
clearly considered laundry services and had chosen to exclude
them from the exempt activities permitted by section 501(e).
Thus, it is arguable that the holdings should apply only to hospital
service organizations which provide laundry services. This is par-
ticularly true of the decision in Associated Hospital. Unfortu-
nately, the holding of HCSC-Laundry and Hospital Central
Services is broad enough to apply to any hospital service organiza-
tion which provides any service not expressly provided for in sec-
tion 501(e). Therefore, the appeal presently pending in the Sixth
Circuit with regard to the hospital service organizations should be
closely followed. Should a conflict of the Circuits develop, the
prospect of the Supreme Court settling the controversy is certainly
a probability, particularly if Congress fails to act.
